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BLURRED LINES: STATE V. GRIFFIN AND THE RESULTING
UNCERTAINTY IN NORTH CAROLINA COURTS REGARDING
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC CHECKPOINTS
MICHELLE M. WEINER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario: After a long day of work and sev-
eral drinks at a local bar, a North Carolina driver approaches a traffic
checkpoint on the way home. Upon approaching the checkpoint, the
driver realizes that he left his cellular telephone at the bar. He acti-
vates his turn signal and makes a legal left turn away from the check-
point to retrieve the telephone. The driver is immediately pursued
and stopped by police officers who were monitoring the entrance of
the checkpoint. The police officers administer a field sobriety test on
the driver, and subsequently charge the driver with driving while im-
paired. At trial, the driver files a motion to suppress the evidence
obtained from the stop, challenging the constitutionality of the traffic
checkpoint. The driver claims that, independent of the existence of
the checkpoint, there was insufficient reasonable suspicion to justify
the stop.
Is the trial court required to determine the constitutionality of the
checkpoint? What standard should the trial court use in making this
constitutional determination? Does it make a difference that the
driver's turn away from the checkpoint was legal? Can an unconstitu-
tional checkpoint be factored into the reasonable suspicion analysis?
The North Carolina Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Grif-
fin presents unsettling answers to these questions, and leaves the
Fourth Amendment rights of North Carolina citizens in jeopardy.
This case note will discuss the current state of North Carolina's case
law regarding the constitutionality of traffic checkpoints and the stan-
dard of reasonable, articulable suspicion. This note will critique the
holding in State v. Griffin, and the impact of that holding in light of
other recent North Carolina Supreme Court decisions. Finally, this
note will explore the current options available to trial courts and law
enforcement officers to safeguard the Fourth Amendment rights of
North Carolina citizens in the performance of their daily work.
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II. THE CASE
Griffin arises from the arrest of Kevin Earl Griffin for driving while
impaired.' On the night of January 5, 2009, North Carolina Highway
Patrol Trooper Scott Casner conducted a driver's license checkpoint
on Highway 306 in Pamlico County.2 At approximately 9:55 p.m.,
Trooper Casner observed Griffin's vehicle approach the checkpoint,
make a left turn onto the shoulder of the road, and then position his
car in the opposite direction.' Trooper Casner immediately pulled up
behind Griffin's vehicle and requested his driver's license. At that
point, Trooper Casner detected the odor of alcohol on Griffin, and
subsequently charged Griffin for driving while impaired.5
On June 4, 2010, Griffin filed a motion to suppress all evidence ob-
tained from the traffic stop.6 Griffin argued that the checkpoint was
unconstitutional and therefore his actions in turning around the vehi-
cle did not constitute sufficient reasonable suspicion for the stop.'
The trial court denied Griffin's motion to suppress, finding that there
was reasonable and articulable suspicion for Trooper Casner to stop
Griffin.' Griffin pled "no contest" to driving while impaired, but re-
served his right to appeal the pre-trial ruling denying his motion to
suppress.9
In a unanimous and unpublished opinion, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Griffin's motion to sup-
press and vacated the resulting judgment.'0 The court analyzed the
constitutionality of the checkpoint, and found that there were not
enough facts in the record to conclude that the checkpoint at issue was
appropriately tailored to fit its primary purpose of checking each
driver for a valid driver's license." The court therefore held "that the
checkpoint violated defendant's constitutional rights, and that the evi-
dence obtained as a result of the checkpoint should have been sup-
pressed." 2 Finding the checkpoint unconstitutional, the court did not
1. State v. Griffin, N.C. ,_, _ S.E.2d _, _, No. 451PA12, 2013 WL 1501643,
at *1 (2013).
2. Id.
3. State v. Griffin, 732 S.E.2d 394, 2012 WL 4501653, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2012),
rev'd, No. 451PA12, 2013 WL 1501643 (N.C. Apr. 12, 2013).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Griffin, - N.C. at , _ S.E.2d at -, 2013 WL 1501643, at *1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Griffin, 732 S.E.2d 394, 2012 WL 4501653, at *3. .
12. Id.
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address whether there was reasonable suspicion for Trooper Casner to
stop Griffin's vehicle.'
The State petitioned the North Carolina Supreme Court for discre-
tionary review pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31. 14 The Court, in a
6-to-1 opinion authored by Justice Newby, reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals and held that "[g]iven the place and manner of de-
fendant's turn in conjunction with his proximity to the checkpoint ...
there was reasonable suspicion that defendant was violating the law;
thus the stop was constitutional."" The Court further determined
that it was not necessary to address the constitutionality of the check-
point because there were sufficient grounds for reasonable suspicion
independent of the existence of the checkpoint.16
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Beasley disagreed with the major-
ity's holding that reasonable suspicion could be found independent of
the existence of the checkpoint." Justice Beasley explained that,
while the presence of a checkpoint can be a factor for the court to
consider, "the trial court must also determine the validity of the
checkpoint if it is to be used in determining whether there was reason-
able suspicion to stop a vehicle because it turned away from the
checkpoint."" Justice Beasley further pointed out that, "[w]ithout the
checkpoint, Trooper Casner would not have been in a position to ob-
serve defendant's turn and defendant would not have been in a posi-
tion to allegedly avoid the checkpoint." 9 Further, Justice Beasley
emphasized the fact that Trooper Casner's testimony at the suppres-
sion hearing left the legality of Griffin's actions uncertain.2 0 She
stated that "while it is clear that defendant did not turn at a major
intersection of roadways, Trooper Casner's recollection of the point
on the road at which defendant turned was inconsistent."2 ' Justice
Beasley concluded that "[the] turn was legal and, by Trooper Casner's
own admission, it was unclear whether defendant was indeed attempt-
ing to turn around."2 2 Justice Beasley recommended remanding the
case to the trial court for further findings regarding the constitutional-
ity and statutory validity of the driver's license checkpoint, and that if
the trial court found that the checkpoint was valid, the existence of the
checkpoint could be factored into the "time, place, and manner" anal-
13. Griffin, - N.C. at -, S.E.2d at -, 2013 WL 1501643, at *1.
14. Id. at , S.E.2d at , 2013 WL 1501643, at *1-2.
15. Id. at , S.E.2d at , 2013 WL 1501643, at *2.
16. Id.
17. Id. at , S.E.2d at , 2013 WL 1501643, at *2-3 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at , S.E.2d at , 2013 WL 1501643, at *4.
19. Id.
20. Id..
21. Id.
22. Id..
3
Weiner: Blurred Lines: State v. Griffin and the Resulting Uncertainty in
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2013
2013] TRAFFIC CHECKPOINTS IN NORTH CAROLINA
ysis to determine whether there was reasonable articulable suspicion
for the traffic stop. 23
III. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
individuals "against unreasonable searches and seizures."2 The pri-
mary purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to "impose a standard of
'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion of . . . law enforce-
ment agents, in order to 'safeguard the privacy and security of individ-
uals against arbitrary invasions. '"25 Griffin implicates the Fourth
Amendment because "[a] traffic stop is a seizure 'even though the
purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite
brief.' "26 "While license checks . .. are not per se unconstitutional, it
is well established that stopping a person at such checkpoints is a
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and therefore
must be reasonable." 27 "A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasona-
ble in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing." 2 8
Checkpoint stops are not based on "individualized suspicion," and
therefore must be "carried out in a manner that avoids the exercise of
'unbridled discretion' by officers in the field."' 29 However, "[b]ecause
checkpoint stops are minimally intrusive, and are not subjective stops,
like those arising from roving patrols, checkpoints are viewed with less
scrutiny than are roving patrols""o Thus, a checkpoint stop conforms
to the Fourth Amendment if it is reasonable, and the reasonableness
of the checkpoint (hence its constitutionality) must be judged on the
basis of the individual circumstances.3
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a search conducted without a
warrant is "unreasonable unless it falls within one of the 'well deline-
ated exceptions' to the warrant requirement."3 2 "One such exception
is the authority of law enforcement officers to effect a limited investi-
23. Id.(citing State v. Foreman, 351 N.C. 627, 629, 527 S.E.2d 921, 923 (2000)).
24. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
25. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 312 (1978)).
26. State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 246, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (2008) (quoting Prouse, 440
U.S. at 653).
27. State v. Mitchell, 358 N.C. 63, 72, 592 S.E.2d 543, 549 (2004) (Brady, J, dissenting) (cit-
ing Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54).
28. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520
U.S. 305, 308 (1997)).
29. Mitchell, 358 N.C. at 72, 592 S.E.2d at 549 (Brady, J., dissenting) (quoting Prouse, 440
U.S. at 663).
30. Id. at 66, 592 S.E.2d at 545 (majority opinion).
31. See id. (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).
32. United States v. Smith, 396 F.3d 579, 583 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
133
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gatory detention when they possess 'a reasonable and articulable sus-
picion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity.'" 3 3 Two
kinds of traffic stops include "investigatory" traffic stops and traffic
stops based on a "perceived traffic violation". 34 Traffic stops based on
a perceived violation require the standard of probable cause; while
investigatory stops require only the reasonable, articulable suspicion
standard.3 5  The United States Supreme Court has explained that
"reasonable, articulable suspicion" is "'a particularized and objective'
basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity."3 6
North Carolina courts have interpreted the reasonable and articul-
able suspicion standard to require that "[t]he stop . .. be based on
specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from
those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious of-
ficer, guided by his experience and training." 3  In determining
whether reasonable suspicion exists, the court must consider the total-
ity of the circumstances.3 1 "Consistent with the totality of the circum-
stances approach, a court must ascertain whether all of the
circumstances taken together amount to reasonable suspicion."" The
fundamental question in Griffin is whether the defendant's actions in
turning away from the checkpoint were sufficient to constitute reason-
able articulable suspicion without a consideration of the constitution-
ality of the checkpoint.4 0
The reasonable, articulable suspicion standard has been applied to
investigatory traffic stops since Terry v. Ohio in 1968.41 This applica-
tion was upheld by the United States Supreme Court of the United
States in 2000 in Illinois v. Wardlow. 42  In Wardlow, the Court ex-
plained that, "[w]hile 'reasonable suspicion' is a less demanding stan-
dard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less
than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires
33. Id. (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980) (per curiam); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).
34. Barnard, 362 N.C. at 250, 658 S.E.2d at 647.
35. See id.
36. Smith, 396 F.3d at 583 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996);
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
37. Barnard, 362 N.C. at 247, 658 S.E.2d at 645 (quoting State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441,
446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22).
38. Id. (quoting Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417).
39. Id. at 250, 658 S.E.2d at 647 (Brady, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citing United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989)).
40. See State v. Griffin, _N.C._,_,_S.E.2d._,_, No. 451PA12, 2013 WL
1501643, at *2(2013).
41. Barnard, 362 N.C. at 249, 658 S.E.2d at 646 (Brady, J., dissenting); see also Terry, 392
U.S. 1 (holding that, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an officer may conduct a brief,
investigatory stop when faced with reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity).
42. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
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at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the
stop. "43
In Griffin, both the majority and the dissent relied on State v. Fore-
man to resolve the issue presented.4 4 In Foreman, the defendant was
arrested and charged with driving while impaired after turning away
from a checkpoint.4 5 At 2:00 a.m. an officer observed the defendant's
vehicle make a "quick left turn" immediately before passing the
checkpoint notice signs.4 6 Unlike in Griffin, the officer did not imme-
diately pull over the vehicle, but rather followed the defendant as she
made a second abrupt left turn.47 The defendant then pulled into a
residential driveway and turned off the car lights and ignition.48 The
officer testified that he was able to see people crouched down inside
the car.4 9 The officer then approached the vehicle and observed sev-
eral containers of alcohol in the vehicle, and a strong smell of alcohol
both in the car and on the defendant.5 0 Before trial, the defendant
moved to suppress the officer's observations, arguing that the evi-
dence was inadmissible because of an invalid stop and seizure.5 ' The
trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, and the North
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.5 2
The North Carolina Supreme Court modified and affirmed the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals, reasoning that, "[a]lthough we disap-
prove of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that a legal turn away from
a DWI checkpoint, upon entering the checkpoint's perimeters, cannot
justify an investigatory stop, we find no error in defendant's convic-
tion."5 The Court explained that, while "a legal turn, by itself, is not
sufficient to establish a reasonable, articulable suspicion, a legal turn
in conjunction with other circumstances, such as the time, place and
manner in which it is made, may constitute a reasonable, articulable
suspicion which could justify an investigatory stop."54 Therefore, "if
defendant was seized solely based on a legal left turn preceding the
DWI checkpoint, that seizure was unconstitutional." 5 The Court held
that
43. Id. at 123 (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7).
44. See Griffin, N.C. at,_S.E.2d at _ 2013 WL 1501643, at *3, *4.
45. State v. Foreman, 351 N.C. 627, 628, 527 S.E.2d 921, 922 (2000).
46. Id. at 629, 527 S.E.2d at 922.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 629, 527 S.E.2d at 923.
51. Id. at 628-30, 527 S.E.2d at 923.
52. Id. at 628, 527 S.E.2d at 922.
53. Id..
54. Id. at 631, 527 S.E.2d at 923 (emphasis in original).
55. Id. at 630, 527 S.E.2d at 923.
135
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it is reasonable and permissible for an officer to monitor a check-
point's entrance for vehicles whose drivers may be attempting to avoid
the checkpoint, and it necessarily follows that an officer, in conjunc-
tion with the totality of the circumstances .. . may pursue and stop a
vehicle which has turned away from a checkpoint within its perimeters
for reasonable inquiry to determine why the vehicle turned away.56
Further, the Court emphasized in dicta that "it is constitutionally per-
missible, and undoubtedly prudent, for officers to follow vehicles that
legally avoid DWI checkpoints, in order to ascertain whether other
factors exist which raise a reasonable and articulable suspicion that an
occupant of the vehicle is engaged in criminal activity.",5
Four years later in State v. Mitchell, the North Carolina Supreme
Court again considered the issue of reasonable and articulable suspi-
cion surrounding a traffic checkpoint.5 In Mitchell, the defendant
was arrested and charged with driving while impaired after he refused
to stop at a driver's license checkpoint." At 4:15 a.m., the defendant
approached the checkpoint, and when the officer directed the defen-
dant to stop, the defendant sped up and drove through the check-
point.6 0 The officer pursued the defendant, who finally stopped after
over a mile.6 1 The defendant moved to suppress the stop and arrest,
contending that the traffic checkpoint was unconstitutional.6 2 Citing
Foreman, the Court found that the officer did have sufficient reasona-
ble articulable suspicion to stop the defendant independent of the
checkpoint.6 3 However, the Court noted that the facts of the case
"[did] not deal with the circumstance where a driver makes a legal
turn away from a checkpoint."6 4
In his dissent, Justice Brady explained that "[p]olice officers may
certainly develop reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a car based
upon their observations, unrelated to the checkpoint, that a crime has
been committed. Armed with such suspicion, the officers' seizure of
the vehicle is proper regardless of the constitutionality of the check-
point."6 5 Justice Brady disagreed with the majority's resolution of the
56. Id. at 632-33, 527 S.E.2d at 924 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 633, 527 S.E.2d at 925 (Frye, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
58. See Mitchell, 358 N.C. 63, 66-69, 592 S.E.2d 543, 545-46 (2004).
59. See id. at 64-65, 592 S.E.2d at 544.
60. See id. at 65-69, 592 S.E.2d at 544-47.
61. Id. at 66, 592 S.E.2d at 544.
62. Id at 65, 592 S.E.2d at 544-45.
63. Id. at 69-70, 592 S.E.2d at 546-47 (quoting State v. Foreman, 351 N.C. 627, 631, 527
S.E.2d 921, 923 (2000); citing, N.C. GFN. STAr. H§ 20-140(a), 141.5(a) (2001) ("[W]ithout con-
cluding that defendant committed any crimes . . . [the officer] had reasonable articulable suspi-
cion that defendant committed several crimes: assaulting a police officer, 'attempting to elude a
law enforcement officer who is in the lawful performance of his duties' . . . and driving a vehicle
'carelessly and heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others."').
64. Id. at 69, 592 S.E.2d at 547 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 71, 592 S.E.2d at 548 (Brady, J., dissenting).
7
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case based on a finding of reasonable suspicion, and instead believed
that the paramount question of the case should have been the consti-
tutionality of the checkpoint.66 Justice Brady pointed out that, pursu-
ant to the arresting officer's testimony at the suppression hearing, the
defendant's vehicle was stopped solely as a result of the random
checkpoint.6 7 Therefore, "[a]s the license checkpoint was the impetus
for defendant's stop, the determinative issue is . . . [whether] the ran-
dom license checkpoint [was] unreasonable and therefore
unconstitutional[.] "68
The majority in Griffin cited to the persuasive Fourth Circuit opin-
ion of United States v. Smith.6" In Smith, the defendant was arrested
after turning away from a driver's license checkpoint in Durham,
North Carolina. 70 At approximately 3:00 a.m., the arresting officer
observed that the defendant approached the checkpoint and then "ap-
peared to slam on [his] brakes."7 1 The defendant then made a left
turn onto a private gravel driveway leading to a single residence. 72
Based on these observations, the officer followed the defendant down
the driveway and eventually charged the defendant with possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon.73 The Court held that
when law enforcement officers observe conduct suggesting that a
driver is attempting to evade a police roadblock-such as unsafe or
erratic driving or behavior indicating the driver is trying to hide from
officers-police may take that behavior into account in determining
whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and investi-
gate the situation further.74
Therefore, the court explained that, while evasion of a road block is
not alone dispositive, it is a factor to consider in determining whether
there is sufficient reasonable suspicion to investigate further.7 5
Justice Beasley's dissent in Griffin pointed out that North Carolina
precedent "has been less than clear on how a trial court should ap-
proach a constitutional analysis of a checkpoint."7 6 The statutory va-
lidity of traffic checkpoints in North Carolina is governed by N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 20-16.3A (2011); however, "mere compliance with [this
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 72, 592 S.E.2d at 548.
69. See State v. Griffin, _ N.C. at , S.E.2d at _, No. 451 PA12, 2013 WL 1501643,
at *3 (2013).
70. . United States v. Smith, 396 F.3d 579, 581-82 (2005).
71. Id. at 581.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 581-82.
74. Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
75. See id.
76. State v. Griffin, - N.C. -, , S.E.2d, _, 2013 WL 1501643, at *5 (2013)
(Beasley, J., dissenting).
137
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statute] does not insulate a checkpoint from constitutional scrutiny."7 7
Justice Beasley attempted to synthesize this ambiguous jurisprudence,
and pointed to both Mitchell and Foreman for guidance. She inter-
preted Mitchell as setting out two factors for trial courts to consider in
determining the constitutionality of a checkpoint: (1) whether a su-
pervisor approved the checkpoint, and (2) whether the officer con-
ducting the checkpoint abided by the supervisor's instructions for the
checkpoint. Justice Beasley's dissent also explained that the North
Carolina Court of Appeals has identified a list of non-exclusive factors
for trial courts to consider in their analysis, but these factors are not
determinative and have not been adopted by the North Carolina Su-
preme Court.7 9 Further, she noted that Foreman cites Michigan Dep't
of State Police v. Sitz where "[tihe United States Supreme Court held
that DWI checkpoints are constitutional if vehicles are stopped ac-
cording to a neutral, articulable standard (e.g., every vehicle) and if
the government interest in conducting the checkpoint outweighs the
degree of the intrusion."so Justice Beasley reasoned that, based on
Foreman's reliance on Sitz, North Carolina trial courts should be
guided by United States Supreme Court case law, as well as Mitchell,
in determining the constitutionality of traffic checkpoints.,
In Brown v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court explained that
a constitutional determination of the reasonableness of a stop "in-
volves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest,
and the severity of the interference with individual liberty."8 2 Pursu-
ant to the Fourth Amendment, "a seizure must be based on specific,
objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require the
seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried
out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers."8 3
In Griffin, the majority also relied on State v. Barnard.84 In Bar-
nard, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered whether a defen-
dant's constitutional rights were violated by a traffic stop that led to
77. Id.("The General Assembly cannot interpret the North Carolina Constitution or United
States Constitution; that is a power that belongs exclusively to the judicial branch." (internal
citations omitted)).
78. Id. (citing Mitchell, 358 N.C. at 72, 592 S.E.2d at 549).
79. Id. (citing State v. Rose, 170 N.C. App. 284, 612 S.E.2d 336 (2005); State v. Veazey, 191
N.C. App. 181, 662 S.E.2d 683 (2008); Sitz, 496 U.S. 444)
80. Id. (quoting Foreman, 351 N.C. at 629, 527 S.E.2d at 922; Sitz, 496 U.S. 444).
81. Id.
82. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
83. Id. at 51 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663(1979)).
84. See Griffin, - N.C. at _, _ S.E.2d at _, 2013 WL 1501643, at *2.
9
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his conviction.15 At approximately 12:15 a.m. an officer pulled up be-
hind the defendant at a stoplight.8 6 After the light turned green, the
defendant remained stopped for approximately thirty seconds before
making a legal left turn." Based on these facts, the officer then initi-
ated a stop of the vehicle which led to the defendant's arrest.88 The
trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, and a divided
Court of Appeals panel found no error. 9 The North Carolina Su-
preme Court, in a 5-to-2 majority opinion written by Justice Newby,
held that "[the] defendant's thirty-second delay at a green traffic light
under these circumstances gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspi-
cion that defendant may have been driving while impaired[.]" 90 The
Court therefore found that the stop of the defendant's vehicle was
constitutional. 91
In a vehement dissent, Justice Brady strongly disagreed with the
majority's reasoning, and stated that "standing alone, [the thirty-sec-
ond delay] could not have raised a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that defendant was engaged in criminal activity."9 2 Justice Brady ex-
plained that "appellate courts should take great care not to set the
standard of reasonable, articulable suspicion so low that the Fourth
Amendment is rendered meaningless."" Citing Brown, Justice Brady
stated that "the requisite degree of suspicion must be high enough 'to
assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not
subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of of-
ficers in the field."' 94 He pointed out that the North Carolina Su-
preme Court "now stands alone among the nation's courts of last
resort in holding that a single factor susceptible of innocent explana-
tion can give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot."95 Justice Brady poignantly forecasted that "the ma-
jority has lowered the threshold of the Fourth Amendment's standard
of reasonable, articulable suspicion to an unacceptable level, danger-
ously exposing the citizens of North Carolina to the potential for un-
reasonable and arbitrary police practices unchecked by our state's
trial and appellate courts. "96
85. Barnard, 362 N.C. at 244, 658 S.E.2d at 644 (2008).
86. Id. at 245, 658 S.E.2d at 644.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 246, 658 S.E.2d at 644.
90. Id. at 244-45, 658 S.E.2d at 644.
91. Id. at 245, 658 S.E.2d at 644.
92. Id. at 248, 658 S.E.2d at 646 (Brady, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 251, 658 S.E.2d at 647.
94. Id. (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51(1979)).
95. Id. at 259-60, 658 S.E.2d at 653 (emphasis in original).
96. Id. at 248. 658 S.E.2d at 646.
139
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IV. ANALYSIS
In Griffin, the North Carolina Supreme Court allowed discretionary
review of a unanimous unpublished Court of Appeals decision, and
had the opportunity to resolve a consistently unclear issue in North
Carolina's jurisprudence; namely, what is the proper constitutional
analysis that trial courts should apply to traffic checkpoints?" How-
ever, rather than resolve the ambiguity, the Court further muddies the
water of North Carolina precedent, and establishes a rule that endan-
gers the Fourth Amendment rights of all North Carolina citizens.
The rule established in Griffin can be understood as follows: any
turn away from a driver's license checkpoint is, alone, sufficient to
establish reasonable articulable suspicion to justify an investigatory
traffic stop, without a consideration of the constitutionality of said
checkpoint.98 Because the trial court did not make any clear findings
or conclusions regarding the legality of Griffin's actions, this rule must
be read to apply to any turn away from a checkpoint, legal or illegal."
Further, this rule even applies to a legal turn away from an unconstitu-
tional checkpoint. The trial court did not engage in a constitutional
analysis of the checkpoint, and the Court of Appeals subsequently
ruled that the checkpoint was unconstitutional.'o Thus, by only ad-
dressing the issue of reasonable suspicion, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has established that any turn away from a checkpoint
can be sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion, even where there
are insufficient findings from the trial court to determine either the
legality of the turn or the constitutionality of the checkpoint.'o'
Trial courts should apply the Griffin rule with caution in order to
properly safeguard the Fourth Amendment rights of criminal defend-
ants. In her dissent, Justice Beasley pointed out that there were insuf-
ficient findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court
regarding the statutory validity of the checkpoint under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 20-16.3A.' 02 While she explained that, given a different set of
facts, reasonable suspicion could be found without considering the ex-
istence of a checkpoint; in Griffin, "there [was] no basis for reasonable
suspicion independent of the checkpoint."' 03 Justice Beasley empha-
sized that the arresting officer did not identify a moving violation or
other violation of the law when observing Griffin's turn, and had he
"been stationed along the highway to check for speeding or other traf-
97. See generally State v. Griffin, _ N.C. -, - S.E.2d -, 2013 WL 1501643 (2013).
98. See id. at _S.E.2d at , 2013 WL 1501643 at*6 (Beasley, J. dissenting).
99. See id at_ , -S.E.2d at 2013 WL 1501643, at *7 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at -, - S.E.2d at _, 2013 WL 1501643, at *1 (majority opinion).
101. See id. at , S.E.2d at , 2013 WL 1501643, at *1.
102. Id. at , S.E.2d at , 2013 WL 1501643, at *5 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at , S.E.2d at , 2013 WL 1501643, at *6.
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fic violations, he could not have stopped defendant based solely on his
legal turn."1 04 Justice Beasley soundly concluded that, because the of-
ficer's suspicion was aroused solely based on the existence of a check-
point, the constitutionality of the checkpoint must be decided."o'
Disregarding the problematic Griffin rule will not leave law en-
forcement officers without recourse to apprehend motorists who le-
gally attempt to evade valid traffic checkpoints. It is prudent police
practice for officers to follow vehicles that avoid checkpoints "in order
to ascertain whether other factors exist which raise a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that an occupant of the vehicle is engaged in
criminal activity."10 6 In fact, in almost every case cited by the majority
in which the stop and seizure was upheld as constitutional, the officer
did not immediately pull over the vehicle, but rather followed the de-
fendant until there was reasonable suspicion sufficient to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment. 0 7 By allowing officers to forego the prudent
and necessary step of following evading motorists, Griffin has sanc-
tioned the use of traffic checkpoints in a manner that allows for "the
exercise of 'unbridled discretion' by officers in the field." 08
The majority in Griffin discussed Foreman in an apparent attempt
to find precedential support for its decision.' 09 Foreman explained
that "a legal turn, by itself, is not sufficient to establish a reasonable,
articulable suspicion, [however,] a legal turn in conjunction with other
circumstances, such as the time, place and manner in which it is made,
may constitute a reasonable, articulable suspicion which could justify
an investigatory stop."o The majority attempted to apply this rule by
stating, "[g]iven the place and manner of defendant's turn in conjunc-
tion with his proximity to the checkpoint, we hold there was reasona-
ble suspicion that defendant was violating the law; thus the stop was
constitutional.""' Griffin reasoned that "even a legal turn, when
viewed in the totality of the circumstances, may give rise to reasonable
104. Id.
105. Id..
106. State v. Foreman, 351 N.C. 627, 630-31, 527 S.E.2d 921, 923 (2000).
107. See, eg., id. (explaining that the officer followed the defendant and observed her pull
into a residential driveway and crouch down to avoid detection by law enforcement); State v.
Mitchell, , 358 N.C. 63, 72, 592 S.E.2d 543, 549 (noting that the defendant drove through the
checkpoint and the officer followed him for over one mile); United States v. Smith, 396 F.3d 579
(explaining that the officer followed the defendant and observed the defendant pull into a resi-
dential driveway). But see Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 658 S.E.2d 643 (noting that the defendant
waited at a green light for thirty seconds and the officer immediately pulled him over).
108. State v. Mitchell, 358 N.C. 63, 72, 592 S.E.2d 543, 549 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648,663).
109. See Griffin, - N.C. at , S.E.2d at _, 2013 WL 1501643, *2.
110. Foreman, 351 N.C. at 631, 527 S.E.2d at 923.
111. Griffin, - N.C. at _, - S.E.2d at _, 2013 WL 1501643, at *2.
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suspicion."1 2 However, the Court does not identify what was consid-
ered in their analysis of the "place and manner" of the turn; in fact,
the only circumstance it explicitly identified in its totality of the cir-
cumstances analysis is the existence of the driver's license check-
point.'" 3 Therefore, as Griffin's proximity to the checkpoint was the
sole factor explicitly considered by the majority, it is incomprehensi-
ble how a judgment could be issued on the merits without a constitu-
tional analysis of said checkpoint.
The majority in Griffin did not make a determination regarding the
legality of Griffin's turn, but characterized Griffin's actions as "more
suspicious" than the defendants' actions in Foreman and Smith." 4 In
Foreman the defendant deliberately attempted to evade the police at
2:00 a.m. by hiding in her car in a residential driveway."' In Smith,
the defendant slammed on his breaks at approximately 3:00 a.m. and,
in an attempt to elude the pursuing officer, pulled into a residential
driveway." 6 The majority did not provide any support for its state-
ment that Griffin's turn in the middle of the road was "more suspi-
cious" than the defendant's turn onto a connecting street in Foreman,
or the defendant's turn into a private driveway in Smith."' In her
dissent, Justice Beasley explained that the trial court's order did not
contain any findings that Griffin was driving erratically or irresponsi-
bly, and that the arresting officer's own testimony suggests the turn
was legal.'1 8
The North Carolina Supreme Court was not required to decide
Griffin after the Court of Appeals issued a unanimous and unpub-
lished opinion on the matter; the opinion had no precedential value
and therefore no impact on the state's jurisprudence." 9 In exercising
its discretion to hear Griffin, the Court should have used this opportu-
nity to establish a clear rule as to how trial courts should conduct a
constitutional analysis of traffic checkpoints. Instead, the Court chose
to not address the matter. By avoiding the creation of a clear rule, the
court has established a rule that is problematic and severely jeopar-
dizes the constitutional rights of motorists in North Carolina. As it
stands, law enforcement officers have no clear directive as to when
and for what reasons they can initiate a stop of a vehicle that has
112. Id. .
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at _, - S.E.2d at _ , 2013 WL 1501643, at *6 (Beasley, J., dissenting) (citing
Foreman, 351 N.C. at 633, 527 S.E.2d at 922-23).
116. Id. citing United States v. Smith, 396 F.3d 579,581 (2004))
117. Id. at , - S.E.2d at , 2013 WL 1501643, at *2 (majority opinion).
118. Id. at _ - S.E.2d at _, 2013 WL 1501643, at *7 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (2011).
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turned away from a checkpoint. Further, trial courts have no gui-
dance as to how to determine the constitutionality of checkpoints.
The rule established in Griffin is especially disturbing when viewed
in light of Barnard, also authored by Justice Newby. Barnard estab-
lished that "a single factor susceptible of innocent explanation can
give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot."12 0 After Griffin, such a "single factor" can be now determina-
tive, even when coupled with unconstitutional police practices. 2 ' Jus-
tice Brady's language in his Barnard dissent is especially poignant in
light of the court's ruling in Griffin; the "threshold of the Fourth
Amendment's standard of reasonable, articulable suspicion" has been
lowered "to an unacceptable level[.]"' 2 2 North Carolina citizens are
now "dangerously expos[ed]" "to the potential for unreasonable and
arbitrary police practices[.]"' 2 3 Such a lowered standard clearly does
not fulfill the primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment to "impose
a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion . . . of
law enforcement agents, in order to 'safeguard the privacy and secur-
ity of individuals against arbitrary invasions."124 Rather, as Justice
Beasley forewarned in her dissent, the majority's decision in Griffin
will "give police officers carte blanche to set up illegal checkpoints and
stop motorists for no other reasoning than that they simply turned
around." 2 5 Therefore, with Griffin and Barnard, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has virtually stripped North Carolina motorists of
their Fourth Amendment rights and has given the State exactly "the
sort of unchecked power that the Fourth Amendment seeks to
prevent."12 6
V. CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve
an area of particular ambiguity in our state's jurisprudence in Griffin.
Instead, the Court chose to issue a ruling that has a profound and
detrimental impact on the constitutional rights of all North Carolina
citizens. This state's highest court has now sanctioned the use of a
single factor, susceptible of innocent explanation, to be determinative
120. State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. at 259-60, 658 S.E.2d 643,652 (2008) (Brady, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
121. See id.
122. See id. at 248, 659 S.E.2d at 646.
123. See id.
124. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 ("persons in automobiles on public roadways
may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled
discretion of police officers." Id. at 663).
125. State v. Griffin, - N.C. , -, - S.E.2d , , 2013 WL 1501643, *6 (Beasley,
J., dissenting).
126. Id.
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of reasonable suspicion, even when accompanied by unconstitutional
police practices. Further, the Court did not provide any guidance, and
in fact only contributed confusion and uncertainty to law enforcement
officers and trial courts who must attempt to apply this rule in their
daily work.
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